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REGAINING TRUST IN NONPROFIT CHARTER
SCHOOLS: TOWARD BENEFIT CORPORATION
BRANDING FOR FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS
The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed, for lack of a
better word, is good. Greed is right, greed works. Greed
clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the
evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms—greed for life,
for money, for love, knowledge—has marked the upward
surge of mankind. And greed, you mark my words, will not
only save Teldar Paper, but that other malfunctioning
corporation called the USA. Thank you very much.1
– The infamous stock-trading mogul, Gordon Gekko, in the
movie Wall Street.

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT AMERICAN
NONPROFIT CHARTER SCHOOL LANDSCAPE

Since the first charter school opened in Minnesota in 1991,
the political and educational spheres have enshrined charter
schools in positive rhetoric, hailing them as “laboratories of
innovation.”2 Encouraging charter school creation is one of the
cornerstones of the Obama Administration’s “Race to the Top”
program, and this support is similarly reflected in federal and
state legislatures.3 Notwithstanding conflicting studies
assessing charter school effectiveness as compared to
traditional public schools, it is clear from the annually
WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987).
Susan L. DeJarnatt, Follow the Money: Charter Schools and Financial
Accountability, 44 URB. LAW. 37, 38 (2012).
3 See Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan, Competitive Grants and Educational
Federalism: President Obama’s Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice, 41
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 522, 527 (2011) (Under Obama’s “Race to the Top” program,
“one specific criterion awarded up to forty points for states that had created conditions
to promote the development of high-performing public charter schools and other
innovative schools. The weighting clearly favored charter schools, though, because if a
state had many policies to promote different alternatives except charter schools then
the most it could earn on this criterion was eight points.”). See also DeJarnatt, supra
note 2, at 38.
1
2
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increasing number of charter schools coupled with federal and
state backing that charter schools are here to stay.4
Despite the optimistic affirmation that charter schools
receive, the nonprofit charter school movement has recently
come under intense government and media scrutiny.5 This has
been spurred by scandals involving education management
organizations (“EMOs”), which some nonprofit charter schools
hire to operate their charter schools wholly or in part.6
The scrutiny began when the growing number of nonprofit
charter schools caught the private sector’s attention several
years ago. Venture capital firms and hedge fund managers
began to view nonprofit charter schools as a “largely untapped
and potentially lucrative market.”7 This raised an interesting
question: why did venture capital firms and hedge fund
managers find nonprofit charter schools so attractive as a

4 See Elaine Liu, Solving the Puzzle of Charter Schools: A New Framework for
Understanding and Improving Charter School Legislation and Performance, 2015
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 273, 285–89 (2015). While it is not this Note’s purpose to evaluate
whether charter schools deliver superior education to public schools, it is worth noting
that there are many conflicting studies assessing charter school effectiveness. Several
studies have seriously questioned the premise that charter schools employ innovative
teaching methods both more effectively and more often than public schools. What is
certain though, is that much like in public schools, student performance varies
significantly between charter schools in the same states and across different states.
5 John Morley, For-Profit and Nonprofit Charter Schools: An Agency Costs
Approach, 115 YALE L.J. 1782, 1795 (2006). Scholars and the public sometimes conflate
a charter school’s entity choice, such as being a nonprofit versus for-profit entity, with
a third-party contractor’s form, and then refer to the charter school as a nonprofit or
for-profit based on the contractor’s form. This is incorrect because sometimes the
charter school is a nonprofit that holds the school’s charter and manages its own
running. But sometimes nonprofit charter schools hold the charter, but then contract
with an external contractor or business to run a substantial part of the school. In the
United States, charter schools, also known as charter holders, can be nonprofit or forprofit institutions. However, a majority of charter schools are nonprofits because many
states’ laws dictate whether a charter school must be a nonprofit. Then, if a charter
school contracts with a vendor or business, that business can be a for-profit or
nonprofit organization itself. And again, there are sometimes state laws regulating
whom a charter school can contract with. This Note will focus on nonprofit charter
schools because the issues addressed solely affect nonprofit charter schools.
6 See Kathleen McGrory, South Miami-Based Charter School Management
Company Under Federal Scrutiny, MIAMI HERALD (April 20, 2014, 9:51 AM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1963142.html
Florida’s largest charter school management company came under federal scrutiny
after an audit report identified “potential conflicts of interest between the for-profit
company Academica and the Mater Academy charter schools it manages. One example
the auditors cited was the transfer of money from Mater Academy to its private
support organization, which shares the same board of directors.” Id.
7 F. Howard Nelson, What Does Private Management Offer Public Education?,
11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 272 (2000).
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means of raising capital when, in return for favorable tax
treatment, nonprofit charter schools are prohibited from
having shareholders or distributing profits?8 The answer came
when the private sector started funding for-profit EMOs to
contract with and operate nonprofit charter schools.9 Funding
EMOs to contract with charter schools had the effect of
diverting the state and federal government funding nonprofit
charter schools received into EMO coffers, which then ended up
in the private sector’s pockets.10 The private sector can access
state funding reserved for public education raised through
taxes because although many states mandate that charter
schools must be nonprofits, there is often no legislation
precluding nonprofit charter schools from contracting with and
paying for-profit organizations for educational services with
their public funding.11 Investing in EMOs became such a
profitable business that firms began providing courses in how
to best privatize charter school education, such as a master
class taught by Capital Roundtables called “Private Equity
Investing in For-Profit Education Companies.”12 Further, the
federal “New Markets Tax Credit” program under the Clinton
administration gave businesses that invest in charter schools
in “underserved” areas a 39% tax credit to offset costs,
incentivizing investing in charter schools and EMOs.13
Some EMOs have since taken a page out of Gordon Gekko’s
book of greed and have been accused of engaging in fraudulent
activities; nonprofit charter school operators have set up for-

8

Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838

(1980).
9 Kathleen
Conn, When School Management Companies Fail: Righting
Educational Wrongs, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 245, 253 (2002).
10 Id. (“[W]hen state charter school laws allow large for-profit corporations to
manage schools, or when nonprofit managers contract with for-profit companies to
provide educational services, the specter of for-profit companies misappropriating tax
dollars is especially frightening.”).
11 See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 1002.33 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2065(b)(1) (States
such as Florida and Georgia are either completely silent on whether charter schools
may contract with EMOs, or explicitly allow for them to do so).
12 Kristin Rawls, Who is Profiting From Charters? The Big Bucks Behind
Charter School Secrecy, Financial Scandal and Corruption, ALTERNET (May 8, 2013),
http://www.alternet.org/education/who-profiting-charters-big-bucks-behind-charterschool-secrecy-financial-scandal-and.
13 Addison Wiggin, Charter School Gravy Train Runs Express to Fat City,
FORBES
(Sep.
10,
2013,
5:31
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2013/09/10/charter-school-gravy-trainruns-express-to-fat-city/#3e9312b270e5.
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profit EMOs to extract and distribute their charter school’s
operating profits.14 Another instance of EMOs abusing charter
school funding occurred when EMOs began redirecting funds
allocated to teacher salaries and resource development to
charge charter schools inflated rent for their facilities.15 While
EMOs manage only approximately 15% of all American
nonprofit charter schools, the negative effects that a few EMOs
have had on the charter schools they manage have cast a
shadow over the charter school movement and other for-profit
EMOs that help charter schools without harming them.16 The
actions of the EMOs involved in scandals are at great odds with
their professed goal of “shap[ing] a world in which every
student, regardless of socioeconomic circumstance, has access
to an excellent education.”17
Charter school exploitation has become such a problem that
the New York State Legislature revised the state’s Charter
Schools Act in May 2010 to prohibit EMOs from contracting
with charter schools.18 Charter schools that contracted with
EMOs prior to the change were allowed to continue their
association.19 New York revised its charter school statute
because although only a small portion of the state’s charter
schools had partnered with EMOs, the bad press that a few
EMO-charter school affiliations created detracted from much of
the positive work that many EMO- and non-EMO-managed

14 Emma Brown, D.C. Officials Seek Stronger Oversight of Charter Schools After
Recent
Fraud
Allegations,
WASH.
POST
(June
15,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/dc-officials-seek-stronger-oversight-ofcharter-schools-after-recent-fraud-allegations/2014/06/15/fb5e1042-f0b4-11e3-bf76447a5df6411f_story.html; Morley, supra note 5, at 1789 (Charter school operators are
those who apply to the relevant state agency for a charter, and once approved, hold the
charter).
15 Catherine Candisky, Charter School’s Lease Deals Scrutinized, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH
(Oct.
12,
2014,
10:10
AM),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/10/12/charters-lease-dealsscrutinized.html.
16 NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS, A CLOSER LOOK AT THE
CHARTER
SCHOOL
MOVEMENT
8
(2016)
http://www.publiccharters.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/New-Closed-2016.pdf (hereinafter “NATIONAL ALLIANCE”).
17 Mission,
EDISON LEARNING, http://edisonlearning.com/mission.php (last
visited June 8, 2016).
18 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2851(1).
19 NEW
YORK CITY CHARTER SCHOOL CENTER, THE PROFIT MYTH:
UNDERSTANDING THE STRUCTURE OF NEW YORK CHARTER SCHOOLS 6 (Sept. 2011),
http://www.nyccharterschools.org/sites/default/files/resources/charter_school_profit_my
th.pdf.
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charter schools had accomplished.20 In order to make sure that
state education funding went to improving student education
instead of for-profit EMO operators, other states have also
banned charter schools from partnering with EMOs, including
New Mexico, Washington, Connecticut, and Mississippi.21
Further, some charter schools have had to shut down because
of EMO mismanagement, and these closures severely disrupted
the education process for students.22 Parents then often
enrolled their children in traditional public schools, causing an
overcrowding problem that the now shuttered charter schools
were meant to alleviate in the first place.23
While there is support for states forbidding charter schools
from contracting with EMOs, there are arguments in favor of
allowing them to continue contracting with EMOs.24 For
example, EMOs often have greater managerial control over a
charter school’s internal operations, and EMOs have the
capital required to invest in research and develop innovative
teaching methods that their traditional public school
counterparts often lack.25 However, the foremost reason that a
party operating a new charter school hires an EMO is that the
party often lacks sufficient experience in school management.26
Thus EMOs may remain an important component of the
charter school movement as they offer new charter school
operators the expertise and resources required to get a charter
school off the ground.27
There is tension between states allowing EMOs to continue
providing charter schools with beneficial expertise and the
need to prevent the damage that some EMOs have caused by
20 Id. at 5 (By 2011, 9% of the 185 charter schools in New York state had
contracted with EMOs.).
21 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-66aa (West 2016); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 37-2839 (West 2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-4 (West 2017); 2016 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. CH.
241 (E.S.S.S.B. 6194) (West).
22 See Conn, supra note 9, at 249.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 GUILBERT C. HENTSCHKE ET AL., TRENDS & BEST PRACTICES FOR EDUCATION
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 5–6 (2003) https://www.wested.org/online_pubs/PP-0302.pdf.
26 Julia Davis, Contracts, Control and Charter Schools: The Success of Charter
Schools Depends on Stronger Nonprofit Board Oversight to Preserve Independence and
Prevent Domination by For-Profit Management Companies, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 8
(2011).
27 Id. (For example, EMOs are better able to negotiate discounted prices for
school supplies).
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exploiting charter schools. The approach some states have
taken is to bar EMOs completely from contracting with charter
schools, and this tactic threatens EMOs’ continuing existence.28
Other states have walked a middle ground by appointing
independent charter school review boards to oversee charter
schools.29 But some argue that adding additional levels of
bureaucracy in the chartering process may interfere with the
original intent behind charter school proliferation—namely,
charter school autonomy and innovation.30 Increasing
legislative hostility toward EMOs means that if offending
EMOs do not change their ways, the focus of the EMO business
model will change. EMOs will no longer be able to focus on
developing innovative teaching methods that will improve
student performance and lead to contract renewal.31 Instead,
their chief concern will be stopping state legislatures from
preventing contracts with charter schools altogether because a
few EMOs have engaged in questionable business practices.
Poor student performance in EMO operated charter schools
has resulted in charter school closures. However, failure to
improve charter school education is not the main reason why
states are reconsidering EMO-charter school affiliations. Gross
financial mismanagement, difficulty tracking how taxpayer
money is spent once it moves from the charter schools into
EMOs, and fraudulent activities are fueling the legislative
backlash against EMOs in states like New York.32 This Note
28 See Kathleen Conn, For-Profit School Management Corporations: Serving the
Wrong Master, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 129, 147 (2002) (“The surest way to abolish the conflict
inherent in the corporate paradigm of shareholder wealth maximization and using
corporate funds to provide the best possible education for students is to prohibit forprofit corporations from managing schools.”).
29 Arianna Prothero, More States Create Independent Charter Approval Boards,
EDUCATION
WEEK
(Aug.
19,
2014),
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/08/20/01authorizers.h34.html.
30 Id.
31 See Conn, supra note 28, at 146 (“In most school privatization contracts, the
school district engages the management corporation, turns over the reins of the school
system, and expects improvement in school district finances and in students’
educational performance. If the expected results do not materialize, the school district
can ‘fire’ the managers and resume control.”).
32 See Conn, supra note 9, at 249 (“However, mismanagement, loss of building
leases, and failure to provide promised educational programs also caused closures.”);
Marian Wang, When Charter Schools are Nonprofit in Name Only, PROPUBLICA (Dec.
9, 2014, 11:49 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/when-charter-schools-arenonprofit-in-name-only (“Regulators in the District of Columbia are seeking more legal
authority over management firms after two recent scandals. The DC Public Charter
School Board has asked the city council to pass legislation that would allow access to
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does not seek to evaluate how successful for-profit EMOs are at
improving the charter schools they work with, because “no
state has analyzed student achievement in charter schools
managed by private managers separately from other charter
schools.”33 Given current projections concerning the prominence
of EMO and charter school partnerships, nonprofit charter
schools will continue contracting with for-profit EMOs,
regardless of performance results, as long as the individual
states allow these relationships.34 As such, this Note will argue
that EMOs are potentially valuable to the nonprofit charter
school movement. EMOs that provide these benefits need to
operate in a way that generates profit while avoiding scandal,
which harms their public perception, because both have a great
deal to offer in terms of bringing education to at-risk children.35
This Note will concentrate on what EMOs can do to regain the
trust of state legislatures so that they are not banned from
contracting with charter schools.
This Note suggests that moving forward, EMOs should
choose to be “benefit corporations” as opposed to traditional CCorps, and to re-brand themselves as such. The benefit
corporation is a new hybrid entity that allows a corporation to
balance the traditional shareholder wealth maximization norm
that corporations generally follow with making decisions that
advance a general public benefit.36 In the case of EMOs, their
general public benefit would be providing nonprofit charter
schools with resources and expertise in exchange for fees. By
adopting the benefit corporation brand, EMOs can show state
legislatures that they are capable of balancing profit-making
prerogatives while benefiting nonprofit charter schools that
hire them. Benefit corporation statutes hold benefit
corporations accountable via two devices: independent thirdparty evaluators and internal enforcement proceedings.37
Implementing these measures would allow states to avoid
the books of management companies under certain conditions. So far, the effort has
gone nowhere.”).
33 Nelson, supra note 7, at 281.
34 Gary Miron, Profiles of For-Profit and Nonprofit Education Management
Organization,
NATIONAL
EDUCATION
POLICY
CENTER
5
(2013),
http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/emo-profiles-11-12.pdf.
35 Liu, supra note 4, at 294.
36 Felicia R. Resor, Benefit Corporation Legislation, 12 WYO. L. REV. 91, 106–07
(2012).
37 Id. at 106–09.
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adding new bureaucratic layers of charter school oversight,
thus saving state resources and allowing charter schools to
maintain their original autonomy.38
While the potential for a decrease in both profits and new
potential investors may make some EMOs hesitant to become
benefit corporations, there is evidence that acting in a socially
responsible way may actually increase a business’s profits and
attract investors who want to make a profit but also want their
money used in conscientious ways.39 Further, it may be more
advantageous for EMOs to be socially responsible than to risk
states following in New York’s footsteps and banning them
entirely, which would have a greater negative affect on an
EMO’s profits.40
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II lays out the
background necessary for understanding why charter schools
exist and their importance in improving American public
education. This Part will provide an overview of the nonprofit
charter school system, including the historical backdrop
against which states passed charter school legislation, how
charter schools operate, and the benefits that charter schools
provide.
Part III explains EMOs, including their function, their
association with the charter school movement, and the benefits
and drawbacks of EMOs contracting with charter schools. This
Part then explores in detail why EMOs are the center of many
nonprofit charter school scandals and how these scandals have
resulted in some states banning EMOs from contracting with
charter schools. The Part will examine several instances where
charter schools and EMOs have been investigated for a lack of
transparency as to how EMOs spend public funding and for
charging charter schools inflated rent.
Part IV introduces the benefit corporation. This Part will
argue that by rebranding themselves as benefit corporations,
EMOs can continue to profit from the public education sector
while not making choices that mismanage charter school
funding. First, this Part will explain the key characteristics of
the benefit corporation entity by comparing the model approach
to benefit corporations against the Delaware approach. Next,

38
39
40

Id.
Id. at 110.
Wang, supra note 32.
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this Part will explore how becoming a benefit corporation will
advance EMOs both by preventing states from banning them
from contracting with charter schools, and by helping them
attract investors and potential shareholders.
Part V will conclude the Note, arguing that EMOs should
not follow the path of Gordon Gekko’s greed speech, and should
instead embrace the benefit corporation and regain the trust of
the states, remain open, and help charter schools.
II.

BACKGROUND: AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES
CHARTER SCHOOL SYSTEM

A. The Historical Underpinnings that Lead to Individual
States Passing Charter School Legislation
While the Supreme Court does not recognize education as a
fundamental right, the Supreme Court agreed that education
was nonetheless of “undisputed importance.”41 Since Brown v.
Board of Education, the Supreme Court charged state and local
governments with the important task of monitoring and
advancing education.42 With the Supreme Court placing this
responsibility on the individual states, state governments
scrambled to improve their education systems.43 However, as of
August 2015, 92% of Americans reported being less than totally
satisfied with the education that students receive in
kindergarten through grade twelve (“K–12”), and by extension,
less than satisfied with the efforts of their respective states in
the education arena.44 This admittedly high statistic is not a
recent trend.45 In fact, America’s lack of total satisfaction with
K–12 education has lingered between 90 and 93% since August
1999, and this trend likely extends back many years.46 In
response to dissatisfaction among parents over the lack of
education options, quality, and diversity in K–12 education,
states began passing legislation granting “independent school
operator[s]” the ability to create charter schools while placing
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.”).
43 Education
Poll, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1612/Education.aspx
(last visited June 2, 2016).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
41
42
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few restrictions on who could start one.47
The charter school concept is based on Milton Friedman’s
free market theories, which posit that allowing parents their
choice of schools would promote competition between charter
school operators and traditional public school operators.48 A
more competitive education market would theoretically be
“more innovative, responsive, and efficient than governmentrun education ‘monopolies.’”49 This is as opposed to the thendominant Keynesian economic model, which stressed that the
government, and not the free market, should guide the
allocation of capital and resources in education.50
B. Charter School Structure and Procedures
Until 1991, parents had three options for their children’s
education: private school, traditional public school, or
homeschool. In 1991, Minnesota became the first state to pass
charter school legislation, introducing a fourth education option
that promised to satisfy parental and state demand for higher
quality and more diverse K–12 education.51 While charter
schools are technically public schools because they receive state
and federal funding, it is important to distinguish them from
traditional public schools that are subject to much stricter state
regulation.52 Since 1991, forty-two other states and the District
of Columbia have passed charter school legislation.53 As of
2014, there were over 6,500 charter schools throughout
America.54 Between 1999 and 2016, student enrollment in
charter schools has increased from 300,000 to 2.9 million.55 The
47 Davis, supra note 26, at 6; James Forman, Do Charter Schools Threaten, 2007
U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 843 (2007).
48 Patrick J. Gallo, Reforming the “Business” of Charter Schools in Pennsylvania,
2014 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 207, 208–09 (2014).
49 Dylan P. Grady, Charter School Revocation: A Method for Efficiency,
Accountability, and Success, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 513, 520–22 (2012).
50 David Groshoff, Uncharted Territory: Market Competition’s Constitutional
Collision with Entrepreneurial Sex-Segregated Charter Schools, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
307, 357 n.2 (2010).
51 Liu, supra note 4, at 276.
52 Davis, supra note 26, at 5.
53 Laws
and Legislation, THE CENTER FOR EDUCATION REFORM,
https://www.edreform.com/issues/choice-charter-schools/laws-legislation/ (last visited
June 3, 2016).
54 Charter School Enrollment, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cgb.asp (last visited June 3, 2016).
55 Id.; NATIONAL ALLIANCE, supra note 16.
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rapid spread of charter schools in the wake of authorizing
legislation is largely attributed to the bipartisan appeal of
charter schools.56
While states may statutorily permit “local districts, state
departments of education, or universities” the ability to grant
charters to specific groups outlined in their respective statutes,
the chartering process itself varies greatly between states.57
States often require that charters last for specific lengths of
time as opposed to allowing them to continue in perpetuity.58
Depending on the state, charter schools may be either nonprofit
or for-profit. For example, several states including Arizona,
Virginia, Colorado, and Wisconsin have enacted statutes that
are silent on which form charter schools must choose.59
However, the majority of charter schools operate as nonprofits,
in part because many states require it.60 This Note will
concentrate on nonprofit charter schools, as they constitute the
bulk of charter schools.
There are several further characteristics that define charter
schools. Charter schools do not charge students tuition.61 In
place of tuition, charter schools receive funding from the
district and state based on the average daily attendance of
pupils.62 States do not, however, provide charter schools with
funding for facilities.63 Charter schools must rely on other
56 See Kathryn Kraft, Cyber Charter Schools—An Analysis of Their Legality, 56
SMU L. REV. 2327, 2330 (2003) (“Republicans support charter schools because these
schools provide competition to traditional public schools, operate without the burdens
of state or local regulations, and must produce strong results in order to continue
operating. Democrats support charter schools because they present a new approach to
education while adhering to the core values of traditional public schools. Democrats
admire charter schools’ innovative approaches to education and appreciate their open
admissions process, free cost, and nonsectarian purpose. Most legislators believe these
schools will provide flexibility and innovation for school curricula and increase parental
involvement.”).
57 Morley, supra note 5, at 1787.
58 James E. Ryan, Charter Schools and Public Education, 4 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. &
CIV. LIBERTIES 393, 395 (2008).
59 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-183 (2002); VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 22.1-212.5–22.1212.16 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.40(7)(3) (West 1999 & Supp.
2002); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.101(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
60 See FLA. STAT. § 1002.33(18)(f) (2011); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-5(a) (West
2006); PA. CONS. STAT. § 17-1702-A (2006).
61 About Charter Schools, NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS,
http://www.publiccharters.org/get-the-facts/public-charter-schools/ (last visited June 4,
2016).
62 Id.
63 Id.
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means of securing a facility, such as grants, loans,
philanthropic donations, or renting from EMOs.64 Most state
laws preclude charter schools from choosing their students.65
Instead, like their traditional public school equivalents, charter
schools provide open enrollment to all students.66 In most
states, if the number of applications a charter school receives
exceeds the number of seats available, the school must use a
lottery system to select students for enrollment.67
Charter schools differ from traditional public schools in that
states do not dictate whom charter schools can hire or what
they teach.68 Charter schools are also “exempt from significant
State or local rules that inhibit the flexible operation and
management of public schools.”69 This autonomy tends to give
charter schools free reign over resource and budget allocation,
staffing, and curriculum creation and implementation.70 Many
states still require charter schools to observe certain
regulations concerning “class size, graduation, bilingual
education, special education, health, safety, and civil rights.”71
C. Charter School Benefits and Goals
State governments hoped to revitalize K–12 education with
charter school legislation by allowing teachers to employ the
“dynamism and experimentation available in autonomous
private schools” combined with public state funding available
to public schools.72 Charter schools therefore inhabit a gray
Id.
Id.; Charter School Procedures, NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR PUBLIC CHARTER
SCHOOLS,
http://www.publiccharters.org/law-database/clear-student-recruitmentenrollment-lottery-procedures/ (last visited June 4, 2016).
66 Charter School Procedures, supra note 65. But see Valerie Strauss, How
Charter School Choose Desirable Students, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2013/02/16/how-charterschools-choose-desirable-students/ (describing situations where many charter schools
have been indirectly selecting students by setting barriers to admissions such as
requiring students to submit long essays, mandatory family interviews, academic
prerequisites, lengthy application forms, and assessment exams).
67 Charter School Procedures, supra note 65.
68 Morley, supra note 5, at 1788.
69 20 U.S.C.A. § 7221i(1)(E) (West 2003).
70 Liu, supra note 4, at 278.
71 Id. at 279. Under Illinois’ administrative code title 23 relating to special
education, charter schools are to be treated as schools within school districts over
which the board of education has jurisdiction. As such, charter schools must comply
with the “special education” part of the code. Id.
72 Davis, supra note 26, at 8.
64
65
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area between wholly “public” and “private” schools by
borrowing aspects of both and incorporating them into a single
educational institution, but with the constraint of needing to
“produce certain result[s] . . . set forth in each charter school’s
charter.”73
Beyond the purported educational advantages that states
hope to achieve, there are several other charter school
advantages. First is an enhanced ability of charter schools to
attract resources.74 Outside of state and federal funding,
nonprofit charter schools can receive supplemental resources in
the form of volunteer staff and donated funds.75 Charter schools
may then use these resources to advance their purpose and
bridge any gaps in funding. Second, charter schools receive
“localized governance.” This differs from the typically
centralized traditional public school structure that can lead to
student alienation and the removal of “authority for crucial
decisions like curriculum design from those best positioned to
make them.”76 In contrast to traditional public schools, charter
schools tend to be smaller, and this encourages improved school
governance and greater parental involvement in a child’s
education.77 Charter authorizers can therefore design rules and
academic performance standards tailored to a charter school’s
student body.78 The decentralized nature of charter schools’
management also leads to greater accountability than is
present in traditional public schools.79 Charter school
authorizers, and not “of system aggregates” as is the case with
traditional public schools, are responsible for the performance
of individual charter schools. 80 As such, a charter school will
not survive if it performs poorly because it cannot hide among
the collective success of other schools in its school system.81
Third, when schools in popular city districts are overcrowded,
especially those districts where “at-risk” children reside, an
73 Monica Teixeira de Sousa, Compelling Honesty: Amending Charter School
Enrollment Laws to Aid Society’s Most Vulnerable, 45 URB. LAW. 105, 135 n.2 (2013).
74 Morley, supra note 5, at 1814.
75 Id. at 1805.
76 Id. at 1815.
77 Id.
78 Walker Richmond, Charter School Accountability: Rhetoric, Results, and
Ramifications, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 330, 340 (2004).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 341.
81 Id.
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operator can apply to open a charter school in that area to
alleviate the strain on an overloaded public school.82 Other
purported benefits include desegregation and decreased need
for spending resources on union contracts.83
D. Charter School Performance and Purposes
Results and opinions vary greatly as to whether nonprofit
charter schools have succeeded in providing a better or more
“innovative” public education in comparison to traditional
public schools.84 The main issue with evaluating charter school
success is that they differ substantially state-to-state.85 Two
meta-analyses of several studies assessing charter school
success found that making a broad conclusion about charter
school success across America may be “premature.”86 However,
a recent study comparing traditional public schools against
charter schools across fifteen states and the District of
Columbia concluded that the majority of charter schools
evaluated did not do significantly better or worse overall than
traditional public schools.87 Thus, charter schools do not
necessarily provide “better” education than traditional public
schools through “innovative” teaching methods or giving local
community members greater control over education. Instead
charter schools supply an education approximately on par with
traditional public schools to communities with little or no
access to other education options.88 While some charter schools
exist solely to provide parents with educational institution
options, charter schools also function essentially as education
“gap-closers” aimed at “improving the outcomes of at-risk
student populations.”89
Having provided a thorough summary of the charter school
movement, this Note will now offer an overview of for-profit
EMOs that partially or fully operate nonprofit charter schools.
Liu, supra note 4, at 296–97.
Morley, supra note 5, at 1814.
84 Dylan P. Grady, Charter School Revocation: A Method for Efficiency,
Accountability, and Success, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 513, 527–31 (2012).
85 Charter Schools: Finding out the Facts: At a Glance, CENTER FOR PUBLIC
EDUCATION (2010), http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/Organizing-aschool/Charter-schools-Finding-out-the-facts-At-a-glance (last visited June 4, 2016).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Liu, supra note 4, at 295.
89 Id.
82
83
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III. EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION OVERVIEW
A. What Are For-Profit EMOs?
EMOs are private for-profit businesses that contract mostly
with charter schools to either operate them entirely or provide
a wide range of services in exchange for a portion (or all) of the
public funding that charter schools receive.90 Such services can
include curriculum creation, hiring teachers, school
management, and providing bulk teaching supplies like
pencils, books, computers, and the like.91 EMOs are distinct
from “vendors” that provide a narrow range of services such as
legal services, accounting, benefits, and payroll.92 EMOs are
also different than Charter Management Organizations
(“CMOs”), which carry out similar functions to EMOs, but do
not operate for-profit.93 The largest American EMOs include
National Heritage Academies, Edison Learning Inc., and White
Hat.94 While there was an explosive increase in the number of
EMOs during the 1990s into the early 2000s, the emergence of
new EMOs has slowed.95 EMOs are now beginning to
consolidate, resulting in a greater number of charter schools
being run by large EMOs.96 As of 2016, EMOs ran 995 charter
schools in the United States, which is approximately 15% of all
charter schools.97
Charter schools and EMOs enter into operation contracts
that outline the relationship between the parties.98 Operation
contracts vary in describing what services the EMO will
provide, but they are generally used as an accountability
measure to track the EMO’s fiscal responsibility and progress

90 Kary Moss, The Right to Read, 15 J.L. SOC’Y 187, 206 (2014) (“Charter schools
account for nearly 93.9% for all EMO-managed schools.”).
91 Lewis D. Solomon, Edison Schools and the Privatization of K-12 Public
Education: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1281, 1284 (2003).
92 Matthew D. Bernstein, Whose Choice Are We Talking About? The Exclusion of
Students with Disabilities from For-Profit Online Charter Schools, 16 RICH. J.L. & PUB.
INT. 487, 501 (2013).
93 Sean Sandoloski, Profiting on America’s Youth? A Study of Educational
Management Organizations, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 199, 204 (2011).
94 Miron, supra note 34, at 478.
95 Id. at 5.
96 Anne E. Trotter, Education Management Organizations and Charter Schools:
Serving All Students, 213 EDUC. LAW REP. 935, 940–41 (2006).
97 NATIONAL ALLIANCE, supra note 16.
98 Trotter, supra note 96, 23.
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toward improving student body performance.99 When the
contract is close to its expiration date, the charter school can
examine whether the EMO met the benchmarks laid out in the
contract and decide whether to continue partnering with the
EMO. EMOs typically do not hold the charter originally
granted to the charter school operators.100 However, few EMO
contracts allow charter school boards to own the charter
school’s physical property.101 Instead, many contracts state that
the EMO owns the school’s physical assets.102 The EMO will
then typically lease the property back to the charter school.103
B. What Are the Benefits and Shortcomings of EMOs in the
Nonprofit Charter School Movement?
There are several arguments in favor of EMOs partnering
with charter schools. First, EMOs allow charter schools to take
advantage of economies of scale.104 That is, EMOs are able to
bargain with vendors when purchasing lunch service for use
throughout all of the charter schools an EMO operates, and
EMOs can negotiate for lower prices when buying textbooks or
computers in bulk, thus spending less money per pupil.105
Second, as newer players in the education field, EMOs are
better positioned to experiment with and tweak different
programs that allow for happier teachers and better educated
students than the entrenched procedures present in many
traditional public school systems and other sub-standard
independent charter schools.106 Third, EMOs provide enhanced
accountability.107 If parents or charter schools do not like an
EMO’s progress toward improving student education, parents
can withdraw their children and charter schools can end their
contract after the contract’s term ends.108 Finally, EMOs
provide expert assistance in addressing major problems that

99 Gary
Miron,
Education
Management
Organizations
http://a100educationalpolicy.pbworks.com/f/EMO_History.pdf.
100 Bernstein, supra note 92, at 501.
101 Nelson, supra note 7, at 276.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Sandoloski, supra note 93, at 203.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 206; Trotter, supra note 96, at 936.
107 Trotter, supra note 96, at 936.
108 Id.

2

(2007),
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new charter schools face such as “overwhelm[ing] . . .
paperwork, securing facilities, financial management, and
overall lack of resources.”109
There are also several shortcomings to EMOs contracting
with nonprofit charter schools. One of the main issues with forprofit EMOs is their inclination toward maximizing
shareholder wealth, a common primary goal in the for-profit
sector.110 This principle is problematic specifically for EMOs in
the education sector, because delivering increased shareholder
and investor profits may force EMOs to choose a lower-cost
means of educating students in charter schools that negatively
impacts the quality of education the students receive, or EMOs
may engage in questionable business practices to deliver
returns.111 An analogy can be drawn between EMO-charter
school partnerships and the pitfalls of the for-profit college
(“FPC”) business model, which has been under media and
government fire for the past decade following allegations of
“financial aid fraud, gross misrepresentations to students, and
deceptive business practices.”112 FPCs accrue money in a
similar way to EMOs, except FPC money comes from federal
student loans and GI Bill grants instead of from public funds
redirected from traditional public schools, with federal
financial aid providing over $20 billion to FPCs every year.113
Like EMOs, FPCs differ from their state-run counterparts in
that the former are largely directed by publically traded
companies or private equity firms, and the latter are largely
directed by trustees primarily motivated by educational
outcome.114 One well-known FPC, the University of Phoenix,
spent $400,000 a day on advertising in 2012.115 The reason
Miron, supra note 99.
Conn, supra note 9, at 254.
111 Id.
112 Aarmer Madhani, New Federal Rules Target For-Profit Colleges, USA TODAY
(Mar.
17,
2014,
1:48
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/03/13/obama-for-profit-collegeregulations/6386565/; Rebecca E. Reif, Knowledge Is Power: Reform of For-Profit
Educational Institutions on an Individual and Institutional Level, 61 DRAKE L. REV.
251, 253 (2012).
113 Sarah Anne Schade, Reining in the Predatory Nature of For-Profit Colleges, 56
ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 328 (2014).
114 Id. at 322; Maura Dundon, Students or Consumers? For-Profit Colleges and
the Practical and Theoretical Role of Consumer Protection, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
375, 376 (2015).
115 Schade, supra note 113, at 323.
109
110
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FPCs spend such large amounts of money on advertising is to
target one demographic: “vulnerable populations, including the
underemployed and out-of-work, military personnel and their
families, low-income students with no prior college experience,
community college students, and minorities.”116 By targeting
these vulnerable populations, FPCs can increase enrollment
and multiply the amount of money FPCs receive in the form of
federal student loans, which they then use to expand their
operations and maximize shareholder and investor profits.117
FPCs tout many of the same advantages that EMOs advertise,
such as flexibility in meeting student needs.118 The FPC’s main
selling point is that they claim to teach students “skilled
trades” or “vocational skills,” making students job-ready upon
graduation.119
In recent years, FPCs have been plagued with poor results
and engaging in fraudulent activities, such as deceptive
marketing practices.120 Much like EMO and charter school
partnerships, some commentators argue that in theory, FPCs
can be beneficial in the education field because they can help
“nontraditional students successfully complete college
programs with workplace skills that enable them to get good
jobs in a tough economy.”121 However, like with EMOs, reform
is necessary to prevent further exploitation of students and
federal government financial aid.122 In the case of FPCs,
commentators argue that the government should be more
selective when allocating student loans to students attending
FPCs, because although for-profit students make up only 11%
of the higher education population, they account for 44% of all
federal student loan defaults.123 The result of government
intervention for FPCs was the reduction of their main stream
of income—namely, federal student loans. In order to avoid a
similar result, EMOs could learn from the situation currently
facing FPCs and rebrand themselves as benefit corporations to
116 Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Need for Legal Reform of the For-Profit
Educational Industry, 79 TENN. L. REV. 515, 528–29 (2012).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 525.
119 See Reif, supra note 112, at 275.
120 Dundon, supra note 114, at 377.
121 Reif, supra note 112, at 275.
122 Id.
123 Note, Forgive and Forget: Bankruptcy Reform in the Context of For-Profit
Colleges, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2018, 2019 (2015).
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mitigate the increased government and media scrutiny.
Although in theory charter school administrators may end
contracts with EMOs if the EMO does not perform well in
carrying out the contract’s terms, there are problems and costs
associated with ending a contract that may dissuade a charter
school from terminating the agreement.124 These include the
availability of adequate replacement EMOs, the cost involved
in searching for and switching to a different EMO, whether the
charter school has available funds to contract with another
EMO, the loss of property to the EMO that the charter school
administrators leased to house their student body, and
intertwinement of charter school board members with the
managing EMO.125 Another drawback occurs in situations
where an EMO fully operates a charter school. In such cases,
EMOs may have a tendency to assert their authority over
charter schools in such a way that they interrupt the charter
school’s founding principles.126
Aside from the shareholder wealth-maximization axiom and
the difficulty exiting from contracts with EMOs, there is one
overarching problem that has brought EMOs into the national
spotlight: misusing public funding that charter schools pay forprofit EMOs in exchange for operating the charter school.
Misusing public funding has resulted in states banning EMOs
from contracting with charter schools.127 This Note will now
examine two specific instances where for-profit EMOs have
either misused taxpayer money or are not transparent about
how they spend taxpayer money. These instances highlight the
need for EMOs to become benefit corporations as a means of
increasing accountability and showing state legislatures that
EMOs are serious about both making profits and advancing
charter school education. The first scenario concerns auditors
who are not able to track how EMOs have spent the taxpayer
money that charter schools pay EMOs. The second situation is
where EMOs have inflated charter school rent, sometimes
redirecting over one-third of a charter school’s funding to pay

124 Katrina E. Bulkley, Losing Voice? Educational Management Organizations
and Charter Schools’ Educational Programs, 37 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y. 204, 228–230
(2005).
125 Id.
126 Trotter, supra note 96, at 941–42.
127 See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER SCHOOL CENTER, supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
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rent for the charter school’s facilities.
C.

Examples of EMOs Misusing Taxpayer Money

1. A lack of transparency when tracking how EMOs spend
charter school money
The majority of EMOs are private companies, and, as such,
once public funds pass from the charter school to the EMO,
regulators, auditors, and charter schools are unable to track
how the EMO spends the money.128 This is because, as private
companies, EMOs are not subject to many of the public
disclosures and transparency rules that other public entities,
such as traditional public schools, must observe.129 A lack of
transparency is especially troublesome for charter schools that
enter into contracts where a charter school hands over a
substantial amount of its funding, usually between 95 and
100%, to the EMO.130 In 2010, New York state auditors tried to
track $10 million in taxpayer public funding that passed
through Brooklyn Excelsior Charter School in New York City
into National Heritage Academies, a large for-profit EMO that
the charter school had contracted with for full operation and
management services.131 The auditors concluded that they were
“unable to verify the true cost of Excelsior’s operations or
determine the extent to which the $10 million of annual public
funding provided to the school was actually used to benefit its
students” because National Heritage, claiming they were
“proprietary, refused to provide financial reports.”132 Excelsior’s
lack of transparency as to how the EMO they contracted with
spent public funding is an all-too-common phenomenon in the
EMO-charter school partnership world, and is partly
responsible for the legislative and media backlash against such
partnerships.133 By rebranding as benefit corporations, EMO
Wang, supra note 32, at 2.
Parker Baxter et al., Public Accountability & Transparency of Charter Schools
&
Management
Organizations
(2015),
http://www.publiccharters.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/APCSA-Public-Accountability-One-Page.pdf.
130 Wang, supra note 32, at 2.
131 Thomas P. DiNapoli, New York State Office of the State Comptroller Division
of State Government Accountability, Oversight of Financial Operations: Brooklyn
Excelsior
Charter
School
5
(Dec.
2012),
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093013/11s14.pdf.
132 Id.
133 DeJarnatt, supra note 2, at 58–66.
128
129
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transparency would be mandatory. EMOs could use their
rebranding efforts to separate themselves from those EMOs
that refuse to share their financial records with auditors. This
could lessen the chance that state legislatures ban EMOcharter school partnerships.
2. EMOs are charging charter schools inflated rent and
creating conflicts of interest
Real estate transactions involving inflated rent and
conflicts of interest constitute the bulk of dishonest business
dealings that have facilitated government scrutiny when it
comes to EMO-charter school contracts. Real estate makes up a
substantial portion of the profits that EMOs receive when
partnering with charter schools.134 Charter schools that partner
with EMOs usually do not own their facilities.135 Instead,
charter schools that partner with EMOs rent school facilities
from the EMO.136 Most EMO-charter school property
transactions follow a similar set of steps as depicted below.
First, the EMO will purchase or build a facility for the charter
school.137 The EMO will improve the facility and then sell it at
a profit.138 The EMO then leases the property back from the
buyer, and subleases the property to a charter school, making a
profit by charging far more than the EMO’s lease payments.139

140

Id. at 47.
Bernstein, supra note 92, at 501.
136 Candisky, supra note 15.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Flowchart created by the author using www.draw.io. The dollar amounts are
used for ease to track how EMOs are able to profit from real estate transactions with
charter schools. These transactions will typically run into the hundreds of thousands to
134
135
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In some cases, the EMO will simply hold onto the property
and charge the charter schools far in excess of the EMO’s
mortgage payments.141 In many cases, the EMO will calculate
rents to obtain maximum reimbursement from state public
funding instead of reflecting the property’s fair market value.142
There are two troubling scenarios where EMO-charter
school facility rental agreements are concerned. In the first,
EMOs sometimes charge charter schools inflated rent.143
Typically, charter schools should not allocate more than 20% of
their operating budget to renting their facilities.144 However, in
some cases charter schools give over one-third of their
operating costs to EMO landlords.145 By spending excessive
amounts on rent, charter schools spend less money on student
instruction. The second troubling scenario occurs where there
are conflicts of interest between EMO operators and charter
school operators concerning rental agreements.146 In 2014, the
U.S. Department of Education investigated Florida’s largest
EMO, Academica Corp., for potential conflicts of interest in its
business dealings with Mater Academy charter schools.147 The
audit found that Academica had created the original nonprofit
Mater Academy in 1998. Since then, several schools in the
Mater network entered into lease agreements with
development companies tied to Academica, thereby filtering
public funding through nonprofit charter schools into the forprofit EMO.148 Audits in other states, including Pennsylvania,
have found similar conflicts of interest involved in real estate
agreements.149 Real estate transactions involving inflated rent
millions of dollars in actual transactions.
141 Jennifer Dixon, Michigan’s Biggest Charter Operator Charges Big Rents: 14
Schools Pay $1M, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 22, 2014, 1:50 AM),
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2014/06/22/michigans-biggest-charteroperator-charges-big-rents-14-schools-pay/77155250/.
142 DeJarnatt, supra note 2, at 73.
143 Rawls, supra note 12.
144 Id.
145 Dixon, supra note 141; DeJarnatt, supra note 2, at 73.
146 Davis, supra note 26, at 13. For example, the former chairwoman for a charter
school negotiated with an EMO that she had multiple family ties with, including a
lease agreement which obligated the charter school to pay $98,000 a month for a school
building. Id.
147 McGrory, supra note 6.
148 Id.
149 FRAUD & SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER, REVIEW OF
CHARTER SCHOOL OVERSIGHT: A FRAUD VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT J-4 (Apr. 2010),
http://www.philadelphiacontroller.org/publications/other%20reports/CharterSchoolInve
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and conflicts of interest constitute the bulk of dishonest
business dealings that have facilitated government scrutiny
when it comes to EMO-charter school contracts, and have
highlighted a greater need for EMO transparency in order to
prevent states banning their partnerships with charter schools.
IV. BENEFIT CORPORATIONS: THE PATH TO RESTORING TRUST
IN EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND NONPROFIT
CHARTER SCHOOL AFFILIATIONS
In light of this need for greater accountability and
transparency among EMOs in order to prevent states from
banning their association with charter schools, the benefit
corporation offers EMOs the opportunity to rebrand and show
that they can do good while generating profits.150 In a postEnron world where there is a growing dissatisfaction with the
corporate landscape, benefit corporation legislation offers
several benefits of which current and future EMOs can take
advantage.151 First, benefit corporations have amplified
accountability. Thus, by branding themselves as benefit
corporations, EMOs can increase transparency that the benefit
corporation structure requires.152 Second, benefit-corporation
branding allows EMOs to make up for the investors they may
lose. A double- or triple-bottom line approach that capitalizes
on “socially responsible investment trends” may compensate for
lost investors.153
A.

Why Was the Benefit Corporation Created and What Are
Benefit Corporations?

1. Why was the benefit corporation created?
The benefit corporation was created as a means of offering
social enterprises the legal protection and certainty that they
required to pursue a “dual mission”: advancing a social goal
while generating financial returns for investors and
stigation_FullReport.pdf.
150 Resor, supra note 36, at 91.
151 Id.
152 See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
153 Sarah Thornsberry, More Burden Than Benefit? Analysis of the Benefit
Corporation Movement in California, 7 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 159, 184
(2013).
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shareholders.154 Instead of pursuing a single bottom line, social
enterprises sought to pursue a triple bottom line, “pursuing not
only economic prosperity, but also environmental quality and
social good.”155 Before states passed benefit corporation
legislation, groups seeking to pursue a public mission generally
had two choices of business entity.
The first choice offers social enterprises the opportunity to
become traditional for-profit corporations. The corporate form
affords businesses certain benefits, such as limited director
liability, transferability of stock, and the ability to raise capital
easily.156 However, for-profit corporations generally follow the
shareholder maximization norm that pervades the for-profit
sector, while eschewing decisions that consider other interests
at the expense of shareholder profits.157 While the holdings in
two famous corporate law cases, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.158 and
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,159 are commonly
understood as requiring directors to consider only shareholder
profits while prohibiting directors and managers from
contemplating other socially beneficial objectives, this
interpretation misconstrues the current state of corporate law
and the reason behind the shareholder maximization axiom.160
The heart of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (“Model
154 J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit
Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for
Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 88–89 (2012). See Robert Katz, The Role of Social
Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 86 (2010) (defining “social enterprise” as an entity having
profit-making goals while also embracing the duty to sometimes make decisions that
will not maximize profit and sharing some of the social aims of a nonprofit corporation).
155 Thornsberry, supra note 153, at 163.
156 See Stephen G. Christianson, Liability of a Director to a Corporation for
Mismanagement, 29 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 133, § 10; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
102(b)(7); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151.
157 Resor, supra note 36, at 95.
158 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
159 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
160 Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO.
WASH L. REV 121, 154–55 (2016); see eBay Domestic Holdings, 16 A.3d 1 (“When
director decisions are reviewed under the business judgment rule, this Court will not
question rational judgments about how promoting non-stockholder interests—be it
through making a charitable contribution, paying employees higher salaries and
benefits, or more general norms like promoting a particular corporate culture—
ultimately promote stockholder value.” What is unclear from this ruling is whether the
business judgment rule will protect directors when they promote non-shareholder
interests without tying that decision into how promoting non-shareholder values will
promote shareholder value. This is the gray area the benefit corporation seeks to
resolve by specifically allowing benefit corporations to pursue both a social mission and
profit generation.); see also Dodge, 170 N.W. 668.
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Legislation”) is premised on the misconception that Dodge and
eBay Domestic Holdings hold that directors must maximize the
corporation’s financial value.161 However, these two cases
actually allow directors to consider broader stakeholder
interests if directors can justify such considerations with any
“rational business purpose.”162 Although the business judgment
rule generally protects directors of for-profit corporations from
shareholder and judicial questioning of business decisions that
are “rationally connected to shareholder benefit,” any decision
that lacks this causation could leave directors open to
lawsuits.163 As such, the justification for benefit corporations
does not stem from a legally enforced shareholder
maximization norm that prevents groups from considering the
interests of other stakeholders, such as employees, at the
expense of shareholder pecuniary interests, because such a
prohibition does not exist in corporate law.164 Instead, benefit
corporations are justified because of uncertainty surrounding
the “interplay between the duty of loyalty and managerial
discretion.”165
This uncertainty plays out in not knowing how much
latitude managers and directors have in making decisions that
benefit stakeholders other than shareholders.166 As such, the
benefit corporation creates a new corporate form that
eliminates
legal
uncertainties
present
in
for-profit
corporations, and not only allows but mandates that managers
and directors balance various stakeholder interests when
making business decisions.167 One corporate form in particular,
the limited liability company (“LLC”), has been a popular
choice for social enterprises in lieu of the benefit corporation
because it offers structural and organizational flexibility, such
as the single taxation available to partnerships combined with
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEG. § 301 (Apr. 2016).
Tu, supra note 160, at 155.
163 J. William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation, and Statutory Design,
26 REGENT U. L. REV. 143, 144–45 (2014); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (The
business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”).
164 Kyle Westaway, The Benefit Corporation: An Economic Analysis with
Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, 62 EMORY L.J. 999, 1012 (2013).
165 Tu, supra note 160, at 155.
166 Id.
167 Id.
161
162
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the limited liability that a corporation’s directors enjoy.168 But
LLCs lack an accountability structure that allows shareholders
to check that the LLC is advancing the social enterprise’s social
mission.169
A social enterprise could also become a nonprofit
corporation. Nonprofit corporations exist to provide “public
goods” in situations where contract failure has occurred.170 The
nonprofit entity is aligned with a social enterprise’s goal of
advancing a social good.171 But a social enterprise would not be
able to generate profits for shareholders because nonprofits are
prohibited from distributing profits, nor can they have
shareholders.172 Instead, any earnings that are not paid for
“services rendered to the organization . . . must be retained and
devoted in their entirety to financing further production of the
services that the organization was formed to provide.”173 With
the advent of the benefit corporation, social enterprises now
have a third option: a new type of legal entity that combines
the nonprofit corporation’s goal of “making the world . . . a
better place” with the traditional for-profit corporation’s goal of
producing profits for shareholders and investors.174
2. What is the benefit corporation?
In 2010, B Lab, a nonprofit corporation whose mission is “to
use the power of business to solve social and environmental
problems,” promulgated the Model Legislation that allows the
formation of benefit corporations as legal corporate entities.175
168 Anna R. Kimbrell, Benefit Corporation Legislation: An Opportunity for Kansas
to Welcome Social Enterprises, 62 U. KAN. L. 549, 554 (2013); Thornsberry, supra note
153, at 171.
169 Thornsberry, supra note 153, at 171.
170 JAMES J. FISHMAN ET AL., NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS
28–30 (5th ed. 2015) (“Contract failure” occurs in situations where “ordinary
contractual devices in themselves do not provide consumers with adequate means for
policing the performance of producers. In such situations, the nonprofit form offers
consumers the protection of another, broader ‘contract’—namely, the organization’s
commitment, through its nonprofit charter, to devote all of its income to the services it
was formed to provide.”).
171 Callison, supra note 163, at 145.
172 FISHMAN, supra note 170, at 4.
173 Id.
174 Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1010 (2013).
175 About B Lab, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-bcorps/about-b-lab (last visited June 5, 2016) (The B Lab Certification merely indicates
that the corporation meets B Lab’s standards).
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Since 2010, thirty-one states have passed benefit corporation
legislation largely based on the Model Legislation.176 As of May
2016, approximately 3,188 businesses have incorporated as
benefit corporations throughout the thirty-one states that have
benefit corporation statutes.177 Benefit corporations should not
be confused with B Corps, which are not legal entities.178 B
Corp status is awarded to corporations that have passed B
Lab’s “B Lab Certification” process, which measures the
corporation’s
social
and
environmental
performance,
transparency, and legal accountability against B Lab’s thirdparty standards.179
Benefit corporations are for-profit corporations “with a
stated public benefit” requiring the corporation’s managers and
directors to balance (i) maximizing shareholder profits, (ii) the
best interests of stakeholders materially affected by the
corporation’s conduct, and (iii) the corporation’s stated public
benefit.180 The general public benefit that a benefit corporation
must consider is defined in the Model Legislation as “[a]
material positive impact on society and the environment, taken
as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the
business and operations of a benefit corporation.”181 Although
benefit corporation statutes differ between the states, they all
share three major obligations:
A benefit corporation: (1) has the corporate purpose to create
a material, positive impact on society and the environment;
(2) expands fiduciary duty to require consideration of
nonfinancial interests; and (3) reports on its overall social and
environmental performance as assessed against a
176 State
by
State
Status
of
Legislation,
BENEFIT CORPORATION,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited June 5, 2016).
177 Find
a
Benefit
Corp,
BENEFIT
CORPORATION,
http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-benefitcorp?field_bcorp_certified_value=&state=&title=&submit2=Go&sort_by=title&sort_ord
er=ASC&op=Go (last visited June 5, 2016).
178 Matthew
J. Dulac, Sustaining the Sustainable Corporation: Benefit
Corporations and the Viability of Going Public, 104 GEO. L.J. 171, 174 (2015).
179 Why B Corps Matter, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-areb-corps/why-b-corps-matter (last visited June 5, 2016).
180 Dulac, supra note 178, at 175; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §362(a).
181 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEG. § 102. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2014)
(Delaware’s “Public Benefit Corporation” differs significantly from the Model
Legislation promulgated by B Labs in that Delaware requires corporations to identify
in its certificate of incorporation a specific public benefit that it will promote. But
Delaware does not require its public benefit corporations to use a third-party standard
when creating reports.).
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comprehensive, credible, independent, and transparent thirdparty standard.182

Benefit corporations therefore differ from traditional forprofit corporations in that benefit corporations are required to
consider the impact that their decisions have on society and
other stakeholders as well as shareholders.183 Thus, when
people invest in benefit corporations, they can obtain stock
price gains and dividends, but shareholders acknowledge that
producing a public good may reduce profitability.184
Instead of benefit corporation legislation creating a new
body of law, the statutes work in tandem with a state’s
corporate law to allow corporations to form as benefit
corporations.185 As such, a state’s corporate statutes continue to
apply except where the benefit corporation statute specifically
displaces general incorporation statutes.186 Some states have
tweaked B Lab’s Model Legislation when passing their own
benefit corporation legislation, but the majority of states closely
follow B Lab’s Model Legislation.187 Two states in particular,
Delaware and Colorado, have adopted statutes with significant
changes to the Model Legislation that set them apart from the
majority of states that have adopted statutes closely aligned
with the Model Legislation.188 Despite the changes, Delaware
and Colorado seek to institute the same principles underlying
the Model Legislation.189 Because many businesses select
Delaware as their state of incorporation, this Subpart will first
compare the key differences between the Model Legislation and
182 Jacob E. Hasler, Contracting for Good: How Benefit Corporations Empower
Investors and Redefine Shareholder Value, 100 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1286 (2014).
183 Joseph Karl Grant, When Making Money and Making a Sustainable and
Societal Difference Collide: Will Benefit Corporations Succeed or Fail?, 46 IND. L. REV.
581 (2013).
184 Callison, supra note 163, at 145.
185 Hasler, supra note 182, at 1286.
186 Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit
Corps, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 279 (2013).
187 See Loewenstein, supra note 174, at 1013 (For example, New Jersey’s benefit
corporation statute has a provision that says “If a benefit corporation has not delivered
a benefit report to the department for a period of two years, the department may
prepare and file a statement that the corporation has forfeited its status as a benefit
corporation.” This provision does not exist in the Model Legislation.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:18-11 (West).
188 Kevin Ercoline, Beyond Puffery, Providing Shareholder Assurance of Societal
Good Will in Crowdfunded Benefit Corporations, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 169, 189 n.70
(2014).
189 Id.
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Delaware’s benefit corporation legislation and suggest which
approach EMOs should choose. 190 And then this Subpart will
explore why EMOs should become benefit corporations.
B. Comparing the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation
with Delaware’s “Public Benefit Corporation” Statute as
a Means of Deciding Which Statute Would Benefit EMOs
the Most
B Labs are the foremost advocates of benefit corporations
and they created the Model Legislation to assist states in
creating their own benefit corporation statutes. Delaware has
enacted its own version of the Model Legislation.191 The two
approaches differ in relation to the flexibility they allow
corporations, with the Delaware approach being more flexible
than the Model Legislation. This Subpart will now provide
overviews of the main provisions in each statute, suggest which
approach EMOs should adopt, and why EMOs should consider
becoming benefit corporations.
1. Overview: Elements of the Model Benefit Corporation
approach
A newly formed benefit corporation’s articles of
incorporation must state that it is a benefit corporation.192 An
existing corporation may become a benefit corporation by
amending its articles of incorporation to state that it is a
benefit corporation, and to be effective, the amendment must
be adopted by a “minimum status vote.”193 A benefit corporation
must create a “general public benefit” in addition to the
corporation’s purpose under the state’s corporate law.194 A
“general public benefit” is defined as a “material positive
impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole,
assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and

190 Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out:
Who’s Opting In?, 14. U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 248 (2014).
191 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362.
192 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 103 (2016).
193 Id. at § 104; see id. § 102 (defining “minimum status vote” as requiring the
“affirmative vote of the shareholders of each class or series entitled to cast at least twothirds of the votes that all shareholders of the class or series are entitled to cast on the
action”).
194 Id. at § 201(a).

Eastman.285-324.docx (Do Not Delete)

314

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

5/31/17 5:20 PM

[2017

operations of a benefit corporation.”195 The Model Legislation
does not state who is to apply the third-party standard. A
benefit corporation may also state a “specific public interest,”
but this is not a requirement under the Model Legislation.196
The benefit corporation’s board of directors must “consider
the effects of any action or inaction upon”: (i) shareholders, (ii)
employees, (iii) customers “as beneficiaries of the general
public benefit or a specific public benefit purpose of the benefit
corporation,” and (iv) societal factors and community, including
communities where the benefit corporation’s offices, facilities,
subsidiaries or its suppliers are located.197 The Model
Legislation does not prioritize any particular interest for
directors to consider and there is no guidance on this matter.
Further, directors are not liable for monetary damages if the
benefit corporation fails to pursue or create a general or
specific public benefit, which means that only equitable
remedies are available to plaintiffs.198 The business judgment
rule protects a director’s business decision with respect to
considering the interests of the various benefit corporation
stakeholders if the director is (i) not interested in the decision’s
subject, (ii) is informed about the subject of the business
judgment, and (iii) “rationally believes” the business judgment
is in the benefit corporation’s best interests.199
A “benefit enforcement proceeding” is any claim for a
benefit corporation’s failure to pursue or create general public
benefit or specific public benefit purpose in its articles of
incorporation, or for violation of statutory obligation, duty, or
standard.200 Benefit enforcement proceedings may only be
commenced or maintained directly by the benefit corporation or
derivatively.201 Further, the only parties who may bring a
benefit enforcement proceeding are (i) a person or group that
195 Id. at § 102(a) (“Third party standard” is a “recognized standard for defining,
reporting, and assessing corporate social and environmental performance” that is
“comprehensive,” developed by an entity not controlled by the benefit corporation,
“credible,” and “transparent.”).
196 Id. at § 201(b); id. at § 102 (Examples include “providing low-income or
underserved individuals or communities with beneficial products or services . . .
promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge . . . [and] conferring any
other particular benefit on society or the environment.”).
197 Id. at § 301(a).
198 Id. at § 301(c).
199 Id. at § 301(e).
200 Id. at § 102(2).
201 Id.
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owns at least two percent of the total shares outstanding at the
time of the omission or act complained of; (ii) a director; (iii) a
person or group owning five percent of equity interests in the
corporation’s parent corporation; or (iv) other persons identified
in the articles of incorporation or benefit corporation’s
bylaws.202 This means that although directors must balance the
interests of stakeholders other than shareholders, those
stakeholders do not have standing to sue a benefit corporation
derivatively for failing to create or pursue public benefits.
Benefit corporations must prepare annual benefit reports
that satisfy many requirements, including a narrative
description of ways the corporation fulfilled its general public
benefit, the extent to which the corporation created the public
benefit, and any circumstances that obstructed the creation of
the general public benefit.203 The narrative must also include
an evaluation of the benefit corporation’s overall environmental
and social performance against a third-party standard and the
compensation paid to each of the corporation’s directors.204 The
benefit corporation must send the annual report to each
shareholder and post the report on the public portion of the
corporation’s website.205
2. The main differences between the Model Legislation and
Delaware approaches
There are two main differences between the Model
Legislation and Delaware’s statute. Delaware refers to benefit
corporations as “public benefit corporations” (“PBCs”). Further,
Delaware’s PBC statute is far less restrictive than the Model
Legislation.206 Instead of mandating that PBCs comply with
certain provisions, the Delaware statute clarifies the fiduciary
duties of the board of directors by expanding their ability to
balance various interests. The Delaware statute then expressly
allows PBCs to adopt many of the provisions in the statute, but
leaves implementation up to the PBC.207 Delving deeper into
202
203
204
205
206

Id. at § 301(c).
Id. at § 401(a).
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(a) (2016).
Id. at § 401(a)-(c).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a)(1) (2015). See Plerhoples, supra note 190, at

254.
207 J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit
Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 352 (2014).
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Delaware’s statute reveals several other significant features
that distinguish it from the Model Legislation.
First, Delaware PBCs are required to state a specific public
benefit in their charter, and not a general public benefit.208
Requiring PBCs to identify a specific public benefit was
intended to “provide focus to the directors . . . and [to give]
investors notice of, and some control over, specific public
purposes the corporation serves.”209
Second, where the Model Legislation requires directors to
“consider” the interests of shareholders and beneficiaries of the
benefit corporation’s public interest, PBCs are required to
“balance the [1] pecuniary interests of the stockholders, [2] the
best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s
conduct, and [3] the specific public benefit or public benefits
identified in its certificate of incorporation.”210 “Balance” is
arguably a stronger term and a more burdensome hurdle for
directors to overcome than the Model Legislation’s use of
“consider.”211 However, there is vast disagreement over the
intended meaning of “consider” and “balance” by their
respective authors and what effect the difference between these
two terms will have.212
Third, PBCs are not required to assess their public benefit
using a third-party standard.213 Fourth, Delaware requires
PBCs to create a “statement as to the corporation’s promotion
of the public benefit” once every two years instead of
annually.214 Further, PBCs only need to provide the report to
shareholders. They are not required to post it on the public
portion of their websites.215 The shareholder statement must
contain (i) the objectives the directors established to promote a
public benefit, (ii) the standards the directors created to
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a)(2) (2015).
Murray, supra note 207, at 370 n.153.
210 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2013).
211 Id.
212 Murray, supra note 207, at 355.
213 Michael A. Hacker, “Profit, People, Planet” Perverted: Holding Benefit
Corporations Accountable to Intended Beneficiaries, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1747, 1780 (2016)
(“Some argue that inclusion of a third-party standard setter negates the possibility of
the creation of nominal benefit corporations designed to “cash in on the cachet of being
perceived as ‘green’ when the corporations are not actually creating any public
benefits.”).
214 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2013) (But the statute allows for PBCs to
require themselves to provide statements more frequently).
215 Id.
208
209
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measure the corporation’s progress in promoting a public
benefit, (iii) whether the PBC was objectively successful in
promoting a public benefit, and (iv) an assessment of the PBC’s
success in promoting a public benefit.216
Fifth, Delaware’s statute does not provide any type of
“benefit enforcement proceeding” to compel PBCs to pursue
their specific public benefit.217 This omission may imply that a
derivative lawsuit is the preferred action against a PBC’s
directors for failing to pursue a public benefit.218
Finally, the Delaware statute explicitly provides protections
for directors where directors are assumed to meet their
fiduciary duties, and allows for PBCs to have a § 102(b)(7)
exculpation clause “eliminating or limiting the personal
liability of a director to the corporation” concerning the
directors’ good faith obligation.219
3. Evaluating the Model Legislation and Delaware
approaches, and deciding which approach EMOs should
adopt
Like all legislation, benefit corporation statutes are
imperfect. They are also still in their infancy.220 As of May
2016, no plaintiff has brought a lawsuit to force a benefit
corporation or PBC to pursue its stated public benefit. There is
no case law concerning these new entities. However, in
evaluating which approach EMOs should choose, it is
important to keep in mind the purpose for which EMOs should
become benefit corporations. The primary reason is neither
puffery nor to make empty promises about avoiding financial
mismanagement. It is to create positive branding that states
can rely on when deciding whether to allow EMOs to continue
operating. In essence, benefit corporation branding would
signal to a state that the EMO is committed to providing
charter schools with expertise and economic savings to improve
student body education. It would allow the EMO to
Id.
See Tu, supra note 160 and accompanying text.
218 Plerhoples, supra note 190, at 257.
219 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(c) (2013).
220 Sean W. Brownridge, Canning Plum Organics: The Avant-Garde Campbell
Soup Company Acquisition and Delaware Public Benefit Corporations Wandering
Revlon-Land, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 703, 711 (2015) Maryland and Vermont were the first
states to pass benefit corporation legislation in 2010. Id.
216
217

Eastman.285-324.docx (Do Not Delete)

318

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

5/31/17 5:20 PM

[2017

acknowledge that it wants to make a profit, while agreeing not
to do so to the charter school’s financial detriment.
In terms of increasing EMO accountability, the Model
Legislation’s approach to annual reporting that is posted on the
public portion of the benefit corporation’s website is more
robust than Delaware’s biennial requirement. Delaware’s
approach means that two years pass before shareholders or the
state would know whether the PBC had fulfilled its specific
public benefit, and this diminishes the increased accountability
intent behind the Model Legislation.221 However, the Model
Legislation’s reporting requirement is not without its
weaknesses. The Model Legislation’s requirements for annual
reports are vague and have resulted in benefit corporations
releasing annual reports that are nebulous and seem more like
marketing materials than complete, fair evaluations of the
benefit corporation’s progress.222 The Model Legislation also
lacks an effectual enforcement method for corporations that do
not follow the reporting requirement.223 As such, the annual
report requirement could be improved by requiring benefit
corporations to disclose specific information tied to their
performance via an effective enforcement method. However,
between the two, the Model Legislation’s approach sets a
higher benchmark for annual reporting, which would benefit
EMOs in terms of increasing accountability and effective
branding.
The Model Legislation’s third-party standard requirement
is also a better option with regard to improving EMO
accountability to investors and states. Under Delaware’s
statute, the lack of a third-party standard may lead to directors
choosing easy requirements to measure their work against.224
EMOs can increase the states’ trust by choosing a reasonable
third-party standard for evaluating the corporation’s annual
report, as the Model Legislation does not specify the type of
third-party standard benefit corporations should choose. The
mistake that some EMOs may make is choosing a lax thirdMurray, supra note 207, at 360–61.
Id. But see ANNUAL BENEFIT CORPORATION REPORT, PATAGONIA WORKS
(2013), http://www.patagonia.com/pdf/en_US/bcorp_annual_report_2014.pdf (This is an
outstanding forty-three page benefit corporation report that goes into detail on the
corporation’s progress towards fulfilling their general and specific stated public
benefits).
223 Murray, supra note 207, at 360.
224 Hasler, supra note 182, at 1321.
221
222
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party standard. However, this would be detrimental to the
branding purpose and would not be advisable.225 Thus the
Model Legislation’s third-party standard requirement could be
improved by setting out some minimum standards put in place
by a select few well-established third-party organizations that
a benefit corporation would need to consider when choosing a
third-party standard to evaluate its annual report against.226
Delaware’s requirement that PBCs state a specific public
benefit is actually more stringent than the Model Legislation’s
general public benefit requirement. In this regard, Delaware’s
approach would be more advisable for an EMO.227 By requiring
an EMO to focus on a specific public purpose, it is more likely
to pursue that purpose. Directors would more easily recognize
the EMO’s objective, thus improving accountability.228 Even
though the specific public purpose provision is not required
under the model approach, an EMO benefit corporation in a
state that follows the Model Legislation can still specify a
specific public benefit that it wants to pursue in conjunction
with the mandatory general public benefit.229
There are some lingering questions regarding benefit
corporation legislation in general that EMOs will want to keep
in mind when deciding whether to move forward with becoming
benefit corporations. First, there is no case law regarding how
a court will assess a benefit corporation’s balancing of various
stakeholders if a plaintiff brings an enforcement action against
the corporation.230 EMOs may find this uncertainty
unappealing and they may wait until an enforcement
proceeding has gone through a court to see what the court does.
Second, the overall lack of enforcement mechanisms other than
the vague shareholder enforcement action under the Model
Legislation makes it difficult to ensure compliance or to discern
further corporate exploitation.231 Third, the Model Approach
225 Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J.
681, 725 (2013).
226 Kimbrell, supra note 168, at 581.
227 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2013).
228 J.
Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise,
Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27, 33 (2012).
229 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (2016).
230 Ercoline, supra note 188, at 183. (However, “legal scholars commonly agree
that the courts will apply the traditional business judgment rule in benefit enforcement
proceedings when evaluating the Board of Director’s decision-making process.”).
231 Kennan Khatib, The Harms of the Benefit Corporation, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 151,
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requires benefit corporations to consider their impact on society
and the environment.232 It is unclear how courts will interpret
this provision and whether the lack of an equivalent
environmental purpose could create a legal issue for a benefit
corporation, as would be the case with EMOs.233 It is hard to
believe that benefit corporation legislation was intended only
for use by businesses whose primary focus is benefitting the
environment, thus EMOs could argue that their environmental
benefit is having a positive material impact on surrounding
communities by improving K–12 education.234 However, it
remains to be seen how broadly courts will read the
“environment” language.
Finally, stakeholders other than shareholders do not have
standing to bring enforcement proceedings.235 This is
problematic because the people most likely to be negatively
affected by a benefit corporation’s decisions are groups like
employees and those living in surrounding areas who do not
have standing to bring enforcement actions. In the case of
EMOs, the groups most affected by an EMO’s failure to follow
through on its public purpose would be the students and
parents as well as charter school operators. However, given the
difficulty that a court would have in discerning who constitutes
a stakeholder whose interest the benefit corporation must
balance, it is understandable that the legislation left
enforcement proceedings to shareholders as a discernable
group. Shareholders who invest in an EMO benefit corporation
likely have the stakeholder’s interests at heart. If a
shareholder who has standing to bring an enforcement
proceeding observes the EMO failing to fulfill its public benefit,
he or she can instigate an enforcement proceeding in the
interest of the stakeholders.
Overall, it would be in an EMO’s best interest to choose a
state that follows the Model Legislation more closely than
Delaware. It may seem counterintuitive to become a benefit
corporation in a state other than Delaware, as most states look

189 (2015).
232 Katherine R. Lofft, Is A Hybrid Just What the Doctor Ordered? Evaluating the
Potential Use of Alternative Company Structures by Healthcare Enterprises, 25 A.B.A.
HEALTH LAW. 9, 12 (2013).
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(c) (2016).
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to Delaware on corporate law matters.236 However, their lax
attitude towards benefit corporation legislation is actually
detrimental to the social enterprise movement, as it renders
the legislation essentially toothless; many of the requirements
that make the Model Legislation powerful are optional under
Delaware law.237 If a business, such as an EMO, is trying to
send a message via their branding that they are serious about
pursuing a social good as well as making profits, then it would
be wise for EMOs to consider becoming benefit corporations in
a state that follows the Model Legislation more closely than the
hands-off Delaware approach.
C. Why Should EMOs Ultimately Choose to be Benefit
Corporations?
EMOs should choose to become benefit corporations
primarily for branding purposes in order to regain the trust of
state legislatures and to prevent further bans on EMO-charter
school partnerships.238 The Model Legislation’s benefit
enforcement proceeding gives shareholders more power to
bring an action for the corporation’s failure to consider the
interests of various stakeholders.239 Restricting the remedy to
an equitable (rather than monetary) one ensures that plaintiffs
will begin such proceedings solely to align the director’s actions
with the corporation’s stated public benefit, thus increasing
accountability and state trust in EMOs.240 The presence of a
third-party standard requirement for assessing the benefit
corporation’s business decisions would also strengthen the
trust between EMOs and states.
EMOs may be concerned that becoming benefit corporations
would scare away investors. These fears are likely unfounded.
Investing in social enterprises, known as “impact investing,” is
236 Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and
Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 889 (1990) (“Because of Delaware’s market dominance,
the General Corporation Law of Delaware controls the internal affairs of thousands of
corporations, including more than half of the 500 largest industrial firms in the United
States.”); Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of
Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 195 (2011) (“In the
competition for corporate charters, Delaware has since the beginning of the twentieth
century stood alone as the decisive winner.”).
237 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
238 Murray, supra note 228, at 44.
239 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301 (2016).
240 Thornsberry, supra note 153, at 180–81.
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becoming a more frequent occurrence.241 In a J.P. Morgan study
examining social enterprise investing, researchers found that
impact investing offers potential over the next ten years for
invested capital of between $400 billion and $1 trillion with
profits of $183 billion to $667 billion.242 From 2010 to 2012,
sustainable and responsible investing had a growth rate of over
22%, and this growth has continued.243 Generating positive
change motivates investors who invest capital in social
enterprises.244 Those same investors reject the “binary”
approach that their investments can either maximize their
return or maximize a social impact.245 Social enterprise
investing is poised to become a common sector of a diversified
portfolio, allowing people to make “feel good” investments
without worrying that they have to give up substantial profits
to do so.246 Further, customers are expressing a greater interest
in services from corporations that take into account their
societal and environmental impacts. Consumer surveys show
58% of American consumers are more likely to purchase
products from a socially conscientious company.247 Thus given
the recent trend in social impact investing, EMOs will likely
not have too much trouble finding investors or charter schools
as customers.
EMOs branding themselves as benefit corporations would
also have the positive effect of attracting charter schools with
whom EMOs can contract, as they are more likely to trust
EMOs whose stated purpose is to advance charter school goals
when they are shopping around for a business to partner
with.248 If an EMO can attract enough charter schools through
benefit corporation branding, then the EMO will be able to
scale its model and attract investors who are interested in

241 NICK O’DONOHOE, J.P. MORGAN, IMPACT INVESTMENTS: AN EMERGING ASSET
CLASS
1,
7
(2010),
https://thegiin.org/assets/documents/Impact%20Investments%20an%20Emerging%20A
sset%20Class2.pdf (“Impact investments are investments intended to create positive
impact beyond financial return.”).
242 Id. at 6.
243 Id.
244 Deborah J. Walker, Please Welcome the Minnesota Public Benefit Corporation,
11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 151, 180 (2013).
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 153.
248 Hasler, supra note 182, at 1321–22.
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double- or triple-bottom line investments.249
V.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to Gordon Gekko’s speech in Wall Street, greed is
not the way forward for EMOs. Several financial events over
the past decade have left Americans dissatisfied with the
current state of corporations—most notably, the 2008 subprime
mortgage crisis.250 Now, consumers and investors are becoming
more cognizant of the businesses that they choose to support.251
It is wishful thinking to believe that, left to their own devices,
all EMOs can operate without misusing public funding.
Repeated instances of financial mismanagement by EMOs have
shown that some EMOs cannot act in a socially responsible
manner. In a bid for survival, EMOs will need to choose
between two alternatives. They can continue to operate under
their current business model, and risk that a few dishonest
EMOs will justify states banning all EMOs from partnering
with nonprofit charter schools or risk that the states will
institute onerous regulations that result in EMOs no longer
being able to operate in those states.252 Such responses will
result in a huge loss in EMO profits.
The second alternative is benefit-corporation branding. By
choosing to become benefit corporations, EMOs that truly want
to pursue the dual purpose of improving charter school
education and profiting at the same time can separate
themselves from those EMOs that exist to increase their profits
at the expense of charter schools. If they do, states may be less
likely to react to the few disingenuous EMOs with a state-wide
ban on EMOs.
EMO greed can and has caused entire states to ban EMOs.
Id.; Thornsberry, supra note 153, at 185.
Brett J. Travers, Why Reinvent the Wheel?—Protecting Consumers in the
Wake of the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown without the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 457 (2010).
251 Thornsberry, supra note 153, at 188.
252 See Dixon, supra note 141; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 89 (West
2014) (requiring an exhaustive list of requirements a charter school must meet in order
for the Massachusetts Board of Education to approve an EMO-charter school contract).
The requirements include: charter applicants explaining how they chose the EMO and
vetted it, as well as providing evidence that the EMO has a record of positive academic
success with charter schools. As a result of these stringent requirements, there are only
two EMOs in Massachusetts, and they manage only two of the sixty-two charter
schools in the state. Id.
249
250
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EMO greed has damaged their reputation as well as the
reputations of the charter schools with whom they contracted.
EMO greed has detracted from the charter school movement as
a whole, which is a movement that has the potential to make
many positive changes for children with otherwise limited
possibilities. Benefit corporation status would enable EMOs to
fulfill their mission. They can continue to help charter schools,
make a personal profit, and regain the trust of states that are
about to pull the trigger on legislation that outlaws EMO
operations completely.
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